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AbstrAct
European party systems have witnessed the emergence 
of populist discursive elements among political parties 
with quite diverse ideological platforms. In this article we 
analyze the role and correlates of populist political at-
titudes in Spain, France, and Italy, three countries that 
present important differences in the nature of the par-
ties articulating populist discourses. In the first place, we 
conduct factor analyses in order to explore the public 
opinion map of policy preferences and political attitudes 
in these three countries. These analyses reveal the pres-
ence of a clearly distinguishable dimension of populist 
attitudes in all these countries. In the second place, we 
examine the party system articulation of citizen pref-
erences in the bi-dimensional spaces constituted by 
populist attitudes, left-right economic preferences, and 
preferences regarding immigration. Our analysis reveals 
strong associations between populist attitudes and left-
right preferences at the party level, and the orthogonal 
relationship of populist attitudes and immigration prefer-
ences. Finally, our analysis of the socio-structural deter-
minants of populist attitudes reveals the positive asso-
ciation of populist attitudes with lower income levels, less 
qualified occupations, and lower educational levels. 
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resumen
Los sistemas de partidos europeos han sido testigos de la 
articulación de elementos discursivos populistas por parti-
dos con perfiles ideológicos muy diferentes. En este trabajo 
analizamos el papel y los correlatos de las actitudes popu-
listas en España, Francia e Italia, tres países que presentan 
importantes diferencias en términos de la naturaleza de los 
partidos que articulan discursos populistas. En primer lu-
gar, llevamos a cabo análisis factoriales a fin de explorar 
el mapa de preferencias de políticas y actitudes políticas 
en estos tres países. Estos análisis revelan la presencia de 
una dimensión de actitudes populistas claramente distin-
guible en los tres países. En segundo lugar examinamos 
la articulación partidista de las preferencias ciudadanas en 
los espacios bidimensionales constituidos por las actitudes 
populistas, las preferencias económicas de izquierda-dere-
cha y las preferencias relativas a la inmigración. Nuestro 
análisis muestra la presencia de una fuerte asociación, al 
nivel partidista, entre actitudes populistas y preferencias 
económicas, y el carácter ortogonal de la relación entre ac-
titudes populistas y preferencias relativas a la inmigración. 
Finalmente, nuestro análisis de los condicionantes socio-
estructurales de las actitudes populistas revela que estas 
actitudes tienden a estar positivamente asociadas con ni-
veles de ingreso inferiores, con ocupaciones menos cualifi-
cadas y con niveles educativos más bajos. 
PAlAbrAs clAve 
Actitudes populistas; España; Europa; Francia; Italia; 
Opinión pública; Partidos políticos.
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IntroductIon
European party systems have witnessed the in-
creasing prevalence of populist discursive elements 
among political parties with quite diverse ideo-
logical platforms (Mudde 2004; Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2013; Andreadis and Stavrakakis 2017; 
Anselmi 2017). Scholars discuss a myriad of fac-
tors that have favored this political transformation, 
pinpointing to structural processes connected to 
globalization (Kriesi et al. 2008; Inglehart and Norris 
2016), the crisis of European party systems (Mudde 
and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Roberts 2015; Anselmi 
2017; Bornschier 2018) and conjunctural events, 
such as the Great Recession (Hobolt and Tilley 2016; 
Andreadis and Stavrakakis 2017) and the migration 
waves arriving from Africa and the Middle East trig-
gering heightened perceptions of threat (Brubaker 
2017; Ivaldi et al. 2017). 
These studies echo previous comparative analyses 
on West European party systems that revealed a cleav-
age structure around new globalization-demarcation 
divides in two main dimensions, one of economic and 
another of political-cultural content (Kriesi et al. 2008). 
More recently, Häusermann and Kriesi (2015) have 
also revealed the crucial role that divisions between 
voters with particularistic and universalist orientations 
play in West European party systems. 
The ideational theory of populism (Hawkins 
and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018; Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2018) indeed agrees that social contexts 
are necessary to explain support for populist ac-
tors. Yet, to fully understand the interplay between 
populist messages that draw on such contexts and 
the motivation for individuals to support populist par-
ties, the ideational theory also distinguishes between 
populist positions on the supply-side (political par-
ties) and on the demand-side (individual level). Once 
activated by the appropriate framing, individual-level 
latent populist attitudes can play an important role for 
vote choice. Recent empirical studies have explored 
the explanatory value of such latent dispositions and 
found evidence for the direct and indirect impact of 
populist attitudes on party support (Akkerman et al. 
2014; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2017; Lavezzolo 
and Ramiro 2017; Andreadis et al. 2018). 
What is less known so far, however, is how these 
populist attitudes match up with both the social-struc-
tural characteristics of voters and their policy stances. 
Kriesi et al. (2008), for instance, have identified the 
location of radical right voters and parties in spatial 
competition, yet they have not specifically addressed 
the populist content of the attitudes of such voters. 
In addition, these authors focused only on party sys-
tems in which populist forces were located on the 
right side of the political spectrum, a bias that has 
led researchers to confuse the explanation of voting 
for radical right populist parties with the explanation 
of populist attitudes (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
2018). In this article, by contrast, we analyze populist 
attitudes in party systems in which the parties em-
bracing populist discourses (as identified by Hawkins 
and Castanho Silva 2018) adopt very different ideo-
logical platforms. Other scholars (Rico and Anduiza 
2017 and Rico et al 2017) have thoroughly explored 
the role that different attitudinal variables play in the 
explanation of populism. Their work has shown the 
importance of economic perceptions and feelings of 
anger in the formation of populist attitudes in Europe, 
and it has also led to emphasize the importance of 
subjective perceptions of economic hardship and 
relative deprivation over objective characteristics dis-
tinguishing between “losers” and “winners” of the glo-
balization processes (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
2018: 6 and 8). 
Our analyses continue and complement these dif-
ferent studies by examining the role of policy prefer-
ences and populist attitudes in the structuring of public 
attitudes and in the articulation of party system maps 
in these three countries. While these three countries 
have experienced important party system transfor-
mations in the face of economic crises and in the 
context of encompassing globalization processes, 
populist discursive elements (Hawkins and Castanho 
Silva 2018; Ivaldi et al. 2017) have been articulated 
by parties adopting very different ideological and pro-
grammatic platforms (leftist in the case of the France 
Insoumise, Podemos, and Unidad Popular-Izquierda 
Unida, rightist in the case of the Front National and 
the Lega Nord, and centrist and/or ambiguous in the 
case of the Movimento 5 Stelle) and appealing to vot-
ers with different types of ideological, attitudinal, and 
socioeconomic characteristics. Furthermore, scholars 
have identified these countries as belonging to two dif-
ferent political-economic constellations connected to 
the economic role of the state (“capture” in the case 
of Italy and Spain, and “status” in the case of France; 
Beramendi et al. 2015). These political-economic 
characteristics could also have effects on individual 
policy preferences and the socio-economic coalitions 
articulated by political parties (Beramendi et al. 2015). 
Given the important differences that exist between 
these West European societies and party systems, it 
becomes a central task for comparative analyses to 
determine whether populist attitudes are a crucial ele-
ment of the political-ideological maps of these socie-
ties and whether the party system articulation of pop-
ulist attitudes and policy preferences is entirely con-
tingent upon the idiosyncratic characteristics of each 
party and party system or whether, on the contrary, it 
obeys some consistent cross-national pattern. 
Furthermore, if populist attitudes are a key dimen-
sion of European public opinions in general and of 
the attitudinal maps of these societies in particular, 
then it becomes necessary to identify their determi-
nants by extending the analytical frameworks that 
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have been classically used in the analysis of prefer-
ence formation in European politics. Scholars have 
rightly emphasized the thin-ideological character of 
populist ideas (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018; 
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018) and the pres-
ence of important qualitative differences in their artic-
ulation (Ivaldi et al. 2017). But this does not exclude 
the possibility that socio-structural characteristics do 
affect public populist attitudes. This also means that, 
even if it is the case that subjective perceptions and 
feelings provide us with the best empirical predic-
tors of populist attitudes, we are not exempt from the 
task of analyzing and underscoring, if it is empirically 
justified to do so, the role played by different types 
of socio-structural determinants (such as educa-
tion, income, and occupation), in ways that are simi-
lar to those used by Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) or 
Häusermann and Kriesi (2015) regarding the forma-
tion of public policy preferences in Europe. Certainly, 
very different kinds of substantive grievances could 
be connected to populist attitudes in contemporary 
democracies. However, given the fact that current 
economic transformations (including globalization 
and economic shocks) have hit much more severely 
individuals with less economic resources, lower lev-
els of education, typically employed in less qualified 
occupations, we are led to hypothesize that it is the 
less educated, worse qualified and poorer individuals 
who will be more prone to holding populist attitudes. 
Of course, this does not exclude the possibility that 
more complex, interactive effects may be at work in 
the formation of populist attitudes. Furthermore, this 
expectation is also perfectly compatible with the fact 
that subjective perceptions will be, in the end, much 
more directly related to populist attitudes than socio-
structural predictors. Finally, the effects of socio-
structural characteristics do not preclude the possi-
bility that such attitudes can be channeled by parties 
that articulate very different ideological platforms, in 
particular, as far as issues related to immigration and 
national sovereignty are concerned. 
By exploring the role of populist attitudes in these 
countries’ public opinions, their party system articula-
tion, and their association with different types of socio-
structural, non-attitudinal variables, our work aims at 
filling a gap between two different and parallel types of 
analysis of European party systems; one focuses on 
the structuring of policy preferences and the other on 
the attitudinal determinants of populist attitudes. 
Our work is organized as follows. In the first sec-
tion we conduct factor analyses in order to identify 
the public opinion maps of policy preferences and po-
litical attitudes (including populism) in Spain, France, 
and Italy. In the second section we examine the po-
sitions of different partisan groups in the main atti-
tudinal dimensions identified by our analyses. This 
results in a comparative map of populist attitudes and 
policy preferences in public opinions, as well as in 
empirical evidence as to the political articulation of 
these different types of attitudes in these three coun-
tries. In the final section we analyze and compare the 
strictly socio-structural determinants of populist atti-
tudes in Spain, France, and Italy. 
1. PoPulIsm And the AttItudInAl 
mAP of PublIc oPInIons
We understand populism in line with the so-called 
ideational theory (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 
2018; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018). 
Accordingly, populism is a particular understanding 
of politics as a moral struggle based on a Manichean 
outlook that conceives of ‘the people’ as a virtuous 
homogenous group which is confronting an evil, cor-
rupt and self-serving elite. Thus, full manifestations 
of populist ideas and narratives necessarily combine 
these three essential elements of people-centered, 
anti-elitist, and Manichean discourses that will attach 
themselves to more complex ideologies (Hawkins 
and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018). Most importantly, the 
ideational theory puts at the forefront the individual 
level and thus allows not only to explore the interplay 
between the supply and demand sides, but also to 
focus in particular on voters’ characteristics in con-
junction with populist attitudes.
Based on previous theoretical and comparative 
contributions, and in light of the recent trajectories 
of electoral behavior and party system change in the 
three countries covered in this study, we can lay out 
the main expectations that will guide and structure 
our exploration. In the first place, given the recent 
political trajectories in Spain, France, and Italy (pub-
lic mistrust precipitated by economic and respon-
siveness crises, erosion of traditional parties and 
emergence of new political actors channeling dis-
content with established parties) we assume that a 
populist dimension that is clearly different from the 
policy preferences divisions, will be present in the 
public opinions of these three countries. The analy-
sis of this dimension is thus necessary for the under-
standing of the attitudinal maps of these countries. 
Following previous contributions on the socio-demo-
graphic correlates of social discontent (Kriesi et al. 
2008) and populist attitudes (Spruyt et al. 2016; Rico 
and Anduiza 2017), we expect negative associations 
between populist attitudes and educational levels 
and between populist attitudes and occupational and 
professional skills. 
To measure populist attitudes at the individual 
level in the case of Spain and France we rely on an 
inventory by Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde (2012), 
subsequently developed into a six-item version 
(Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2014). These stud-
ies show that populist attitudes are widespread and 
indeed pre-exist short-term changes in social con-
text (Akkerman et al. 2014, Hawkins et al. 2012). 
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Furthermore, these items have been used success-
fully to measure populist attitudes and to explain vote 
choice (e.g. Andreadis and Stavrakakis 2017; Spruyt 
et al. 2016; Andreadis et al. 2018), they have been 
adapted to measure populist attitudes at the elite lev-
el (Andreadis and Ruth-Lovell 2018) and also used in 
experimental research that relates populist attitudes 
to wider behavioural outcomes (Busby et al. 2018). 
Table 1 shows the wording of the survey questions 
for each of these concepts. We implemented these 
questions in online surveys of about 1200 respond-
ents in Spain and about 800 respondents in France. 
The samples were selected from a commercial, by in-
vitation only, on-line pool of respondents (ISO 26362 
certified) aged 18-65 and included sex, age and re-
gional quotas. In Spain the survey was fielded in the 
week before the general election in December 2015 
and in France in the week before the first round of the 
presidential election in April 2017. For Italy unfortu-
nately we cannot rely on the same battery. We there-
fore matched questions as close as possible using 
the 2013 Italian National Election Survey (ITANES), 
which provides us with just two items for populist at-
titudes. For policy preferences we rely on a broad list 
of issues related to the economic left-right, cultural 
attitudes, and attitudes towards the European Union. 
Again, as Table 2 indicates, the questions for Italy dif-
fer slightly due to availability. 
In this first section, we present the results of the 
factor analysis conducted for each one of these three 
countries. Tables 3 to 5 show the structure of three 
principal components for each country that have 
been arrived at by implementing a varimax rotation 
as a method of representation. We discuss first the 
Spanish and French cases, since both analyses are 
based on exactly the same batteries of variables, and 
address the Italian case afterwards. Both in France 
and Spain the battery of populist indicators loads 
onto a single factor, always above the 0.50 threshold. 
This factor provides us with a strong uniform scale 
(eigenvalues of 3.16 in Spain and 2.86 in France), 
and it accounts for slightly more than the 0.20% of the 
variance of these variables. A second factor meas-
ures classical left-right issues of predominantly, but 
not exclusively, economic content. Attitudes towards 
redistribution and the tradeoff between economic 
growth and environmental protection play decisive 
roles in this factor in both countries, in combination 
with attitudes towards gay marriage (particularly in 
Spain) and state economic intervention (particularly 
in France), and to a lesser degree, but also above 
the 0.4 level, privacy protection. Differences mainly 
concern the role of attitudes towards taxes (more im-
portant in Spain and absent in this factor in France) 
and privacy concerns (more important in France). 
The third and least important factor for this battery 
of questions has immigration attitudes at its center in 
both cases. However, there are important disparities 
in the other variables loading onto this factor. In both 
cases attitudes towards EU control of public budg-
ets load onto this factor, but they do so in varying 
ways for each country (with the same sign as immi-
gration attitudes in Spain and with an opposing one 
in France). In other words, individuals favorable to 
immigration are also favorable to having full national 
control of budgets (positive coefficient in both vari-
ables), whereas in France the opposite association 
holds. This is most likely the result of the different 
impact of EU imposed austerity policies in Spain and 
France, which may have led individuals with multi-
cultural and universalist values to reject EU eco-
nomic policies in the former. Finally, and contrary to 
Spain, attitudes towards taxes also load on this factor 
in France. In the latter case, opposition to immigra-
tion (negative coefficient in this variable), and asser-
tion of national budget controls and tax cuts (posi-
tive coefficients for the last two variables) go hand in 
hand. Overall, these results show the presence of an 
attitudinal dimension revealing populist attitudes that 
is clearly distinguishable from policy preferences in 
both countries. In both cases a classical left-right di-
mension that integrates economic redistribution and 
traditional versus libertarian topics is also present. 
Table 1.
Items measuring populist attitudes (scales are reported in parentheses)
Items measuring populist attitudes in Spain and France (1-5)
POP1 The politicians in parliament should follow the will of the people.
POP2 The most important decisions should be made by the people and not by politicians.
POP3 The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.
POP4 I would rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than by an experienced politician.
POP5 Politicians talk too much and take too little action.
POP6 What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one’s own principles.
Items measuring populist attitudes in Italy (1-4)
POP2i If Italians could decide directly about important political matters, instead of relying on politicians, the country would be much better off. 
POP6i In politic, settling for a compromise actually means selling out one’s principles. 
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Finally, a third dimension relates to immigration and, 
to a lesser degree, European integration issues, but 
the association between these two variables is dis-
parate in these two countries, most likely as a result 
of the different role of EU institutions during the Great 
Recession in each one. 
In the Italian case we rely on a battery of ques-
tions that most closely resembles the issues covered 
in the French and Spanish surveys. For populist at-
titudes we use one item that measures orientations 
towards direct democracy and anti-elite sentiment 
(If Italians could decide directly about important po-
litical matters, instead of relying on politicians, the 
country would be much better off) and another one 
that measures the rejection of political negotiations 
and compromises (In politics settling for a compro-
mise actually means selling out one’s principles). For 
policy issues we use relatively similar indicators for 
attitudes towards redistribution, state economic in-
tervention, taxes, immigration, European unification 
(this time in a broad way), and the environment. 
As in Spain and France, the factor analysis reveals 
for Italy a single populist attitudes factor in which our 
two populism indicators load above 0.6. However, 
in the Italian case attitudes towards state interven-
tion and economic redistribution do also load on this 
factor, albeit to a lesser degree. The eigenvalue for 
this factor is lower than in France and Spain (1.4), 
but strong enough to speak of a uniform scale. As in 
the French case, immigration, attitudes towards the 
EU, and towards taxes load on a single factor, anti-
immigration, anti-EU, and anti-taxes attitudes being 
positively associated with each other. Finally, as in 
Spain and France, a separate dimension maps clas-
sical economic left-right attitudes (regarding redistri-
bution and state economic intervention) and attitudes 
towards environmental protection. 
2. Issue dImensIons And PArty 
voters
In the previous section we established the pres-
ence of a populist dimension in the attitudinal maps of 
these three countries’ public opinions. Previous anal-
yses have also shown that populist attitudes have di-
rect effects on vote-choices in many European coun-
tries, including, at the least, Spain and France among 
these cases (Andreadis et al. 2018). Some of these 
analyses have already shown that the voting effects 
of populist attitudes are often conditional on other 
ideological orientations or policy preferences of vot-
ers. In this section we examine the characteristics of 
these three party systems at the demand-side level 
by presenting the distribution of party voters in the 
three dimensions we identified above. Our purpose 
here is not to assess the causal direct or indirect 
impact of populist attitudes on party choices, but to 
identify, from a comparative perspective, the different 
party system constellations of populist attitudes and 
policy preferences in these three cases. This analy-
sis will allow us to locate the positions of party voters 
Table 2.
Policy issues (scales are reported in parentheses).
Item France & Spain (1-10)
State Intervention In favour / against state intervention in the economy.
Redistribution In favour / against redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor.
Taxes vs. Spending In favour of increasing taxes to improve services / In favour of reducing services to lower taxes.
Same-sex marriage In favour / against same-sex marriage.
Liberties vs. Security In favour of the right to privacy even if it makes the fight against crime difficult / In favour of restrict-ing the right to privacy to fight crime.
Immigration In favour of / against limiting immigration.
EU Authority The EU should have more authority over the economic and budgetary policies of the EU Member States / Spain (France) should have total control over economic and budgetary policies.
Environment The protection of the environment must have priority even if it is at the expense of economic growth / Economic growth must have priority even if it is at the expense of the environment.
Item Italy 
State Intervention The Government should abstain from intervening in the economy. Fully agree/ Don’t agree at all. (1-4)
Redistribution The Government should intervene to reduce income inequalities among citizens. Fully agree/ Don’t agree at all. (1-4)
Taxes vs. Spending Reduce taxes and cut public services / Expand public services and increase taxes. (1-7)
Immigration We accept too many immigrants / We could easily accept more. (1-7)
EU unification Unification has already gone too far/ Unification should be further developed. (1-7)
Environment It would be necessary to give greater priority to the protection of the environment. Fully agree/ Don’t agree at all. (1-4)
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Table 3
Factor analysis Populism and Policy issues, Spain. Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization. 
Factor loadings greater than 0.5 are marked in bold
Table 4
Factor analysis Populism and Policy issues, France. Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization. 
Factor loadings greater than 0.5 are marked in bold
SPAIN Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness
Principal components results
Eigenvalue 3.159 2.041 1.129
Variance explained 22.562 14.575 8.066
Cumulative Variance explained 22.562 37.137 45.203
Item and rotated factor loadings
POP5 Politicians talk too much 0.747 0.005 -0.109 0.109
POP2 People should make decisions 0.716 -0.116 0.210 0.210
POP4 Represented by a citizen 0.695 -0.040 0.130 0.130
POP3 Political differences 0.663 -0.165 0.080 0.080
POP6 Compromise is selling out 0.660 0.088 -0.079 -0.079
POP1 Follow the will of the people 0.561 -0.106 0.172 0.172
Redistribution -0.167 0.714 -0.102 -0.102
Environment -0.080 0.703 0.131 0.131
Same-sex marriage -0.072 0.640 -0.071 -0.071
State Intervention 0.089 0.557 0.192 0.192
Taxes vs. Spending -0.017 0.534 -0.134 -0.134
Liberties vs. Security -0.083 0.410 -0.333 -0.333
Immigration 0.017 -0.147 0.813 0.813
EU Authority 0.123 0.100 0.523 0.523
N 1208
FRANCE Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness
Principal components results
Eigenvalue 2.858 2.345 1.290
Variance explained 20.417 16.748 9.212
Cumulative Variance explained 20.417 37.165 46.377
Item and rotated factor loadings
POP2 People should make decisions 0.753 -0.035 0.056 0.504
POP1 Follow the will of the people 0.717 -0.121 0.067 0.554
POP4 Represented by a citizen 0.710 0.005 0.007 0.449
POP3 Political differences 0.608 0.032 -0.035 0.385
POP5 Politicians talk too much 0.601 -0.048 0.128 0.344
POP6 Compromise is selling out 0.562 0.123 0.060 0.721
Redistribution -0.165 0.725 -0.025 0.328
Environment 0.011 0.716 -0.019 0.514
State Intervention 0.065 0.705 -0.050 0.533
Same-sex marriage 0.022 0.569 0.246 0.571
Liberties vs. Security 0.055 0.478 0.335 0.372
Immigration 0.021 0.248 -0.812 0.504
Taxes vs. Spending 0.035 0.260 0.616 0.380
EU Authority 0.310 0.179 0.447 0.335
N 803
POPULIST ATTITUDES, POLICY PREFERENCES, AND PARTY SYSTEMS IN SPAIN, FRANCE, AND ITALY . 7
RIS  [online] 2018, 76 (4), e110. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2018.76.4.18.001
in the three dimensions identified by our analysis, ir-
respective of the causal effects that populist attitudes 
may have on voting once all controls and explanatory 
factors are taken into consideration. 
In the following graphs we present the average 
positions of party voters in the three attitudinal di-
mensions identified by our factor analysis. We have 
labeled as left-right the dimension that maps prefer-
ences for redistribution and state economic interven-
tion and also, to a lesser degree, environmental pro-
tection and civic rights. The other dimensions map 
populist attitudes and particularism versus universal-
ism preferences. In order to combine all countries in 
one single graph we have standardized (at the na-
tional level) average values in these dimensions. 
Figure 1 maps the positions of party voters in 
the left-right and populist attitudes dimensions and 
highlights a strong negative association between 
the positions of party voters in both dimensions. 
The diagonal pits populist leftists and conservative 
anti-populists against each other and results show 
that voters of economically leftist parties tend to 
hold more populist orientations in all three countries 
(Pearson correlation of -0.76, significant at the .001 
level). At one extreme we find the left populist voters 
of Podemos (Pds), Unidad Popular-Izquierda Unida 
(UP-IU), and France Insoumise (FI) and at the op-
posite extreme the right conservative voters of Les 
Républicains (LR) and the Partido Popular (PP). The 
main cases deviating from the line that sets populist 
leftists and conservative anti-populists against each 
other are the voters of the Front National (FN), who 
hold populist attitudes and center-right preferences, 
the Italian Partito Democratico (PD) and En Marche!, 
comprised of voters who hold anti-populist attitudes 
and center-left economic preferences, and, to a less-
er degree, the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S), whose vot-
ers are center-left and highly populist. 
The voters of the Italian coalition Popolo della 
Libertà (PDL) occupy a more moderate position than 
those of French and Spanish conservative parties. In 
this case, it must be taken into consideration that this 
coalition, led by Silvio Berlusconi, also integrated the 
voters of the Lega Nord (LN).1 The off-diagonal quad-
rants of rightist populism and leftist anti-populism are 
largely empty. Put differently, one of the most remark-
able aspects of the location of party voters is that 
there is not a curvilinear pattern of locations, and that 
it is not the case that populist attitudes and gener-
ally extreme ideological locations go hand in hand in 
these party systems. Overall, these analyses reveal 
that for these three cases there is a clear association, 
at the partisan level, between populist attitudes and 
economically leftist, pro-redistributive attitudes. 
Figure 2, in turn, shows the positions of party vot-
ers in the populist attitudes and particularism versus 
multiculturalism/universalism dimensions. It shows 
that their locations are characterized by their orthogo-
nal character, i.e. all quadrants are populated by party 
voters. We find populist particularist party voters, such 
as those of FN and M5S, populist multicultural/uni-
versalist voters, such as those of UP-IU, Podemos or 
FI, anti-populist universalists (EM, SC, PD), and anti-
populist particularists (LR, PP). What this disposition 
suggests is that contrary to positioning on the left-right 
dimension, populist attitudes can be attached to totally 
opposite preferences regarding cultural inclusiveness 
and universalism of national institutions and policies. 
Table 5
Factor analysis Populism and Policy issues, Italy. Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization. 
Factor loadings greater than 0.5 are marked in bold
ITALY Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness
Principal components results
Eigenvalue 1.768 1.401 1.040
Variance explained 22.102 17.517 12.996
Cumulative Variance explained 22.102 39.619 52.615
Item and rotated factor loadings
Immigration 0.753 -0.143 0.031 0.565
Taxes vs. Spending 0.714 0.086 -0.083 0.430
EU unification 0.696 -0.133 -0.015 0.502
POP2i People should make decisions -0.079 0.747 0.030 0.524
POP6i Compromise is selling out -0.091 0.633 -0.148 0.588
Environment -0.008 -0.126 0.730 0.551
State Intervention 0.049 -0.451 -0.587 0.549
Redistribution -0.051 -0.449 0.544 0.500
N 1112
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We cannot address here whether the causes of this 
open pattern of articulation between populist demands 
and particularist orientations lie in structural socio-eco-
nomic factors, individual features, or the characteristic 
party discourses and strategies. Whatever the causes, 
what we found is a remarkable contrast between a 
strong association of left-right economic preferences 
and populist attitudes and a lack of connection be-
tween populist attitudes and particularist-multicultural-
ist/universalist orientations. 
3. the socIAl determInAnts of 
PoPulIst AttItudes
The previous section has revealed that populist 
attitudes are one of the dimensions structuring pub-
lic opinion in Spain, France, and Italy. It has also 
shown that the positions of party voters in the pop-
ulist dimension and the mostly economic left-right 
dimension are strongly connected despite the fact 
that these countries present in theory very different 
kinds of partisan ideological configurations. Analyses 
of populism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwaser 2018; 
Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018) have stressed 
the thin-ideological character of populism and its con-
tingent articulation to different kinds of political and 
ideological platforms. However, our previous empiri-
cal results underscore the need to assess the de-
gree to which populist attitudes may be linked to a 
common constellation of underlying socio-structural 
features affecting both economic preferences and 
populist attitudes. By conducting an analysis of this 
type our study complements works that have focused 
strictly on the determinants of economic and cultural 
preferences -without examining populist attitudes- 
(Häusermann and Kriesi 2015) and works that have 
focused on the determinants of populist attitudes, 
which have particularly addressed the role of differ-
ent kinds of economic judgments and perceptions 
(Rico and Anduiza 2017; Rico et al 2017).
Therefore, in this section we turn our analysis to 
the study of the factors conditioning populist attitudes 
in these cases. With that purpose in mind we have 
conducted a general linear model analysis in order to 
ascertain the effects of different socio-demographic 
variables on populist attitudes. Thus, we are not in-
terested in developing a full-fledged explanation of 
populist attitudes on the bases of other attitudes and 
perceptions, such as economic evaluations, percep-
tions of corruption, or political mistrust, a topic on 
which several insightful contributions already exist 
(Spruyt et al 2016; Rico et al 2017). Rather, we are 
interested in examining whether the locations of indi-
viduals in social structures predispose them to em-
brace populist attitudes in these countries.
In order to assess the influence of social and eco-
nomic characteristics on populist attitudes we run an 
Figure 1
Average positions of party voters in the general left-right and populist attitudes dimensions
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analysis of variance focused on the qualitative, nomi-
nal variables that could influence populist attitudes (a 
continuous variable in this case). These factors are, 
for all countries, education, occupation, gender, and 
age. In the case of Spain and France we also con-
trol for income, although our indicator maps house-
hold income in the first case and individual income in 
the second. Unfortunately, we lack any indicator for 
income in the Italian survey. We use a main effects 
generalized linear model ANOVA analysis aimed at 
ascertaining the effects of each of these factors on 
our dependent variable. This type of technique allows 
us to conduct further analyses that consider all possi-
ble combinations of levels and not just contrasts with 
one reference category. Compared to a simple t test, 
the generalized ANOVA analysis allows us to also re-
duce the risk of type 1 error, that is, of wrongly reject-
ing the null hypothesis when it is true (Lindsey 1997). 
Our results show that income levels help to ac-
count for differences in populist attitudes scores in 
France and Spain. In the Spanish case, occupation 
does also affect populist attitudes. In the case of Italy 
we lack an indicator for personal or family income, 
which may be the reason why in addition to occupa-
tion also age and education are significantly linked 
to populist attitudes. Post hoc tests focusing on in-
come, education, and occupation allow us to interpret 
better the specific effects that social characteristics 
have on populist attitudes.2 We start first with the ef-
fects of income differences reported in Table 7, the 
variable that shows statistically significant effects in 
both France and Spain. The fact that our indicators 
for France and Spain are different (personal income 
in Spain and household income in France) does not 
constrain our ability to make some comparative infer-
ences on the effects of income on populist attitudes. 
In the case of Spain, the analysis shows that individu-
als earning less than 1200 euros and therefore at the 
bottom level of income are more populist than individ-
uals earning more than1800 euros (significant at the 
.01 level). Analyses also show that individuals earn-
ing from 1200 to 1800 euros are more populist than 
individuals earning more than1800 euros (significant 
at the .01 level). By contrast, there are no significant 
differences between the groups with lower and mid-
dle income levels in Spain. In the case of France, 
the difference between individuals from households 
earning less than 2000 euros and between 2000 and 
5000 euros are significant at just the 0.109 level. 
Differences are highly significant, however, between 
individuals from these two groups and individuals 
from households earning more than 5000 euros (at 
the .01 level). 
Table 8 shows group differences for education 
levels. The only common feature for these three 
cases is that college graduates tend to be less pop-
ulist than individuals with upper secondary educa-
tion (differences significant at the .01 levels in Spain 
Figure 2
Average positions of party voters in the particularism versus multiculturalism and populist attitudes dimensions
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and Italy and at the .10 level France). In addition, in 
Italy individuals with basic education also tend to be 
more populist than individuals with college educa-
tion. Overall, the data suggests that individuals with 
the highest education credentials are less populist 
than individuals with secondary, intermediate stud-
ies, whereas the contrasts with very low education 
groups are strong only in the Italian case. 
Finally, our analysis turns to the effects of occu-
pational differences on populist attitudes. We do not 
report all coefficients in Table 9, and leave out of our 
report and analysis groups, such as farmers and the 
self-employed, for which we do not have information 
on all countries. If we focus first on the differences 
between higher occupations (professionals and top 
managers) and the rest, we observe that profession-
als tend to be less populist than routine non-manual 
workers (in France and Spain), skilled workers (in all 
cases), and unskilled workers (in France and Italy). 
As for top managers and bureaucrats, they also tend 
to be less populist than skilled workers (in Spain and 
Italy), and routine non-manual and unskilled workers 
in Italy. Across all three countries, these two groups 
are the least populist. By contrast, skilled workers 
show the most consistent pattern of positive differ-
ences with professionals (statistically significant in 
the three cases) and managers and top bureaucrats 
(significant in Spain and Italy). 
Contrasts among different groups of workers (rou-
tine non-manual, unskilled, and skilled) are less con-
sistent across these cases. Skilled workers tend to 
be more populist than routine non-manual and un-
skilled workers in Spain, but less so than unskilled 
workers in Italy. And in the case of Italy, routine non-
manual workers also tend to be less populist than un-
skilled workers. Contrasts among these groups are 
therefore less marked. Perhaps the most interesting 
characteristic for these groups lies in the presence of 
cross-national differences. In the case of Spain popu-
list attitudes reach their highest levels among skilled 
workers, whereas in Italy it is among the unskilled 
that populist attitudes reach their highest scores. In 
France, by contrast, no differences between these 
groups of workers show up in this analysis. 
conclusIon
Despite the presence of some broad political and 
ideological commonalities, the party systems of 
Spain, France, and Italy have been characterized by 
Table 6
Generalized Linear Model (ANOVA Main Effects). Dependent variable: Populist attitudes (higher values indica-
te more populist attitudes)
Table 7
Multiple comparisons. Post hoc analysis: income and populist attitudes
SPAIN FRANCE ITALY
Variable F Sig. F Sig F Sig.
Corrected Model 3.924 0.000*** 1.670 0.064* 6.112 0.000***
Intercept 0.117 0.732 1.091 0.297 5.046 0.025**
Sex 0.006 0.938 0.135 0.714 2.677 0.102
Education 1.041 0.354 0.311 0.733 13.277 0.000***
Age 1.305 0.272 1.033 0.357 4.756 0.009***
Occupation 2.321 0.042** 0.892 0.500 2.886 0.014**
Income 8.242 0.000*** 4.411 0.013**
R2 0.051 0.041 0.053
P value ≤ *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01 
Personal Income (euros) SPAIN Household Income (euros) FRANCE
I J I J
<1200 1200-1800 0.083 (0.080) <2000 2000-5000 0.202 (0.109)*
>1800 0.390 (0.079)*** >5000 0.572 (0.157)***
1200-1800 <1200 -0.083 (0.080) 2000-5000 <2000 -0.202 (0.109)*
>1800 0.307 (0.090)*** >5000 0.370 (0.136)***
>1800 <1200 -0.390 (0.079)*** >5000 >2000 -0.572 (0.157)***
1200-1800 -0.307 (0.090)*** 2000-5000 -0.370 (0.136)***
P value ≤ *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01. I-J Mean differences with standard errors in parentheses. (DMS)
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important differences in the partisan and program-
matic articulation of populist discourses. The quite 
different orientation of parties adopting populist dis-
courses (radical right and left in France, radical left in 
Spain, and centrist and radical right in Italy) reveals 
the presence of wide variations in the political artic-
ulation of populist ideas in this region. We started 
our analysis with the intention of assessing whether, 
despite the presence of these important differences, 
populist attitudes played a role in the structuring of 
the ideological attitudinal maps in these countries, in 
combination with the policy preferences dimensions 
that have been usually established by comparative 
analyses on European party systems. Our empiri-
cal results are consistent with this expectation, even 
if the measurement tools we had at our disposal, 
Table 8
Multiple comparisons. Post hoc analysis: education and populist attitudes
Table 9
Multiple comparisons. Post hoc analysis: occupation and populist attitudes
Education SPAIN FRANCE ITALY
I J
Basic Education Upper Secondary -0.091 (0.159) -0.030 (0.143) 0.091 (0.095)
College 0.165 (0.158) 0.136 (0.128) 0.565 (0.116)***
Upper Sec Basic Education 0.091 (0.159) 0.030 (0.143) -0.091 (0.095)
College 0.256 (0.067)*** 0.166 (0.103) 0.473 (0.083)***
College Basic Education -0.165 (0.158) -0.136 (0.128) -0.565 (0.116)***
Upper Secondary -0.256 (0.067)*** -0.166 (0.103)* -0.473 (0.083)***
P value ≤ *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01. I-J Mean differences with standard errors in parentheses. (DMS)
Occupation SPAIN FRANCE ITALY
I J
Professionals Managers/Top Bureaucrats -0.160 (0.129) -0.176 (0.195) 0.446 (0.313)
Routine Non-Manual -0.248 (0.077)*** -0.303 (0.134)** -0.241 (0.173)
Skilled -0.603 (0.145)*** -0.364 (0.129)*** -0.359 (0.185)*
Unskilled -0.203 (0.128) -0.351 (0.141)** -0.744 (0.215)***
Managers/Top Bureaucrats Professionals 0.160 (0.129) 0.176 (0.195) -0.446 (0.313)
Routine Non- Manual -0.088 (0.124) -0.126 (0.189) -0.687 (0.279)**
Skilled -0.443 (0.175)** -0.187 (0.186) -0.805 (0.287)***
Unskilled -0.043 (0.161) -0.174 (0.194) -1.190 (0.307)***
Routine Non Manual Professionals 0.248 (0.077)*** 0.303 (0.134)** 0.241 (0.173)
Managers/Top Bureaucrats 0.088 (0.124) 0.126 (0.189) 0.687 (0.279)**
Skilled -0.354 (0.141)** -0.061 (0.120) -0.118 (0.118)
Unskilled 0.045 (0.123) -0.048 (0.132) -0.503 (0.161)***
Skilled Professionals 0.603 (0.145)*** 0.364 (0.129)*** 0.359 (0.185)*
Managers/Top Bureaucrats 0.443 (0.175)** 0.187 (0.186) 0.805 (0.287)***
Routine Non- Manual 0.354 (0.141)** 0.061 (0.120) 0.118 (0.118)
Unskilled 0.400 (0.174)** 0.013 (0.128) -0.385 (0.174)**
Unskilled Professionals 0.203 (0.128) 0.351 (0.141)** 0.744 (0.215)***
Managers/Top Bureaucrats 0.043 (0.161) 0.174 (0.194) 1.190 (0.307)***
Routine Non- Manual -0.045 (0.123) 0.048 (0.132) 0.503 (0.161)***
Skilled -0.400 (0.174)** -0.013 (0.128) 0.385 (0.174)**
P value ≤ *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01. I-J Mean differences with standard errors in parentheses. (DMS). Other levels of this factor have been included in the 
analysis but are not reported for the sake of simplicity. These levels are: farmers (Spain), farmers and semi-skilled (France) and self-employed (Italy).
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particularly in the case of Italy, presented some 
limitations. In all these countries populist attitudes 
proved to be a clearly discernible attitudinal dimen-
sion, along with the most classical left-right dimen-
sion, strongly connected to redistribution and state 
intervention preferences, and with another dimen-
sion mostly mapping attitudes towards immigration 
and globalization. That is, despite the presence of 
some distinctive national characteristics, the attitudi-
nal maps of these three countries presented strong 
similarities in terms of the substantive contents of 
their main attitudinal dimensions and of the role of 
populist orientations in them. 
Our second, exploratory goal was to go beyond 
classical vote-choice models on the effects of popu-
list attitudes and map the positions of party voters in 
the populist and policy preferences dimensions. Our 
exploration revealed a clear association, at the party 
level, between classical left-right, mostly economic 
preferences, and populist attitudes. In this case, 
party voters tended to populate a diagonal leading 
from redistributive populism to pro-market non-pop-
ulism. Symmetrically, no party voters adopted popu-
list and anti-redistributive positions or non-populist 
and pro-redistributive positions. By contrast, our data 
showed the absence of associations between popu-
list attitudes and preferences regarding immigration 
and globalization. Overall, these results endorse the 
interpretation that, at least for this group of cases, 
populist orientations and pro-redistributive attitudes 
tend to go hand in hand. Important disparities among 
the parties representing populist orientations are 
observed in cultural demarcation attitudes. In other 
words, it is in this political-cultural dimension that the 
thin-ideological character of populism is more appar-
ent and that the discursive content of parties repre-
senting populist orientations becomes more diverse 
(Ivaldi et al. 2017). Whether these different patterns 
of discursive and programmatic articulation result 
from socio-structural factors or from partisan agency 
is a question that we cannot address here. 
Finally, our analysis of the structural factors affect-
ing populist attitudes showed that it is among groups 
with fewer occupational skills, lower income levels 
and lower education levels that populist attitudes 
tend to be stronger. These facts endorse the impor-
tance of structural factors in the formation of populist 
attitudes, notwithstanding the role that other subjec-
tive experiences and feelings can play in the emer-
gence of such orientations. The effects of education, 
occupation, and income on populist attitudes help to 
understand why there are significant associations, 
at the party-level, between the populist attitudes of 
party voters and their preferences for redistribution. 
By contrast, the lack of associations between popu-
list attitudes and immigration preferences is consist-
ent with the fact that, in the cultural domain, structur-
ally based economic grievances can be channeled 
by both universalist and particularist political parties. 
This comparative and empirical study has aimed 
at analyzing the presence, political articulation, and 
socio-economic determinants of populist attitudes 
in Spain, France, and Italy. Future developments of 
this work should seek to include other types of socie-
ties and party systems in the analysis and to develop 
more complex and interactive multivariate models fo-
cusing on the socio-economic determinants of popu-
list attitudes. These two goals remain the objective of 
posterior developments of this work. 
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notes
1. Given the low number of LN voters in the survey we had 
to exclude this party from the analysis.
2. We leave gender differences out of the analysis. Men’s 
populist averages are lower than women’s, but this differ-
ence has statistical significance only in the case of Italy.
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